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I.

APPELLANT HAS REASONS SUPPORTING THE ISSUANCE OF THIS WRIT.
In

its

Brief

in

Opposition

to

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari, Appellee Graham complains that Petitioner, in its
initial brief, did not refer the Court to any "special and
important" reasons for the issuance of Writ of Certiorari as
required by Rules 46 and 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

However, the Appellee is not accurate.

Rule 46(d) allowa the Court to consider cases, including:
. . . when the Court of Appeals has decided an
important question of municipal, state, or
federal law which has not been, but should be
settled by the Supreme Court."
Throughout Appellant's brief, it was argued that a need
exists to interpret Utah's Dram Shop law as prohibiting the
providing of alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons, not only
at places of sale, but also when the social host is involved.
Further, Appellant argues that this conclusion can be drawn from
a review of legislative history (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-6),

from Utah's Dram Shop Act itself (Id., pp. 6-8), and as .necessary
protection for the citizens of Utah.
referenced
pleaded

sections

an

examination

demonstrate

important
by

the

question

Supreme

(Id.

that
of

Court

at pp. 11-13).
Appellant

state
and

law

thus

These

clearly
which

has

needs

satisfies

the

requirements of Rules 46 and 49(a), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
II.

THE CASE LAW OF JURISDICTIONS CITED BY APPELLEE
ARE NOT DISPOSITIVE CONCERNING INTERPRETING
UTAH'S DRAM SHOP ACT.

At page 10 of its brief, Appellee argues that a number of
other jurisdictions have statutes similar to Utah's Dram Shop
Act, but which have no application to the social host situation.
However, a close analysis of those cases and the statutes behind
them proves otherwise.
For

example,

although

Appellee

cites

Fabian

v.

Polish

American Veterans, 466 NE 2d 1239 (111. App. 1984), it is clear
from a reading of that case and the Illinois Liquor Control Act,
(§6-21, Illinois Code, 1986), that the statute makes three groups
of defendants liable for injuries sustained by someone as the
result of furnishing liquor to an intoxicated person, including:
(1)

Licensees; (2) hotel\motel room renters who know the room

will be used by persons under 21 years of age for the consumption
of alcohol; and (3) owners/renters of premises where alcoholic
liquors will be sold.

A complete copy of Illinois1 statute

(along with other state's statutes referenced
appears in the appendix of this brief.
2

subsequently)

The Illinois statute
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differs substantially from Utah's Dram Shop Act, and Illinois
case law has little relevance in interpreting the Utah Act.
Further, Missouri case law is not dispositive on the Utah
Act.

To begin with, Missouri's Dram Shop Act was repealed in

1934 (Laws of 1933-34, Extra Session, p. 77).

Under Missouri

Revised Statutes 537.053(1), Missouri, following the common law,
primarily looks to the consumption of alcoholic beverages, rather
than the furnishing of alcoholic beverages in its proximate cause
analysis concerning

"injuries inflicted

upon another by an

intoxicated person."

In addition, under §537.053(3), R.S.Mo.,

liability

specifically

is

found

against

those

previously

convicted of selling liquor to an obviously intoxicated person.
Clearly, Missouri's statute is different in nature from Utah's.
Appellee also cites the Alabama case of Smoyer v. Birmingham
Area Chamber of Commerce, 517 S.2d 585 (Ala. 1987) as standing
for Alabama's refusal to find social host liability.

Smoyer was

a limited case holding only that the hotel manager and an
association hosting a drinking function at a hotel could not be
found liable for injuries sustained when one of the volunteers
at this function subsequently injured a third party with his
automobile.

The court found that no "sale" of liquor had

occurred on the defendant's part, a "sale" being one of the two
requisites under its Illegal Liquor Sales Act (§6-5-7(1), Alabama
Code).
Alabama case law clearly demonstrates that liability may
exist for the social host where there has been a providing of
3

alcoholic beverages contrary to law.
2d 958

In Martin v. Watts, 513 S.

(Ala. 1987), the Supreme Court of Alabama found no

limitation of its Dram Shop Act to a commercial dispenser when
it stated:
Had the legislature intended to limit the
class of persons against whom an action could
be brought, the draftsman could certainly have
employed words much better suited to an
expression of such an intent. If it was the
intention to create a right of action against
only that narrowly defined class of persons,
i.e. "commercial dispensers", the draftsman
could have incorporated that term into the
act.
Or, they could have stopped with the
words "by selling".
They did not do that.
Instead, they included the terms "giving" and
"otherwise disposing of".
It is hard to
imagine
a
phrase
more
expansive
than
"otherwise disposing of".
Id. at p. 961. The court went on to find support for social host
liability by looking back to its former 1909 Act which implied
the same.

Additionally, the Alabama Supreme Court made it very

clear that the name of its Dram Shop Act, "Illegal Liquor Sales
Act", was not dispositive of who the Act pertained to. See also:
Liao v. Harry's Bar, 574 S.2d 775 (Ala. 1990).

(Alabama Supreme

Court considered the liability of wedding reception hosts who
dispensed champagne which eventually resulted in an automobile
accident involving one of the intoxicated guests.

Hosts were

held not liable because they had not actually purchased the
champagne, nor were hosts ever aware that the defendant guest had
become

so

automobile.

intoxicated

that

he

was

unable

to

operate

his

Further, the host committed no act contrary to law,

including the providing of alcohol to a minor).
4

Finally, the Washington case of Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d
759 (Wash. 1988), cited by the Appellee, in its public policy
discussion is not dispositive in this case.

The Washington

Supreme Court in Burkhart was concerned that it was being asked
to find social host liability in the face of the failure of its
legislature to enact the same. Since Washington repealed its own
Dram Shop Act in 1955, and has since followed only the common law
in that area, the court reasoned:
For all these reasons, we decline to extend
common law liability to social hosts. This is
not to say, however, that social host
liability is necessarily an inappropriate
reaction to the problem of drunk driving.
Rather, we hold only that the judiciary is
ill-equipped to impose such a remedy.
Id. at p. 762.

Since the legislature in Utah has acted to

provide a Dram Shop Act with social host liability, Burkhart is
unpersuasive.
The fact remains that a number of states have taken the stand
that their Dram Shop Acts must be interpreted as including social
host liability, and that under the language of Utah's Dram Shop
Act, supported by sound public policy reasoning, this Court is
also asked to rightly interpret Utah's Act as including the
social host and thus fully and adequately protect the citizens
of this state.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J&

day of «*Wh, 1992.

fox^i
ERIK M. WARD

CHR
Attorneys for Appe/lant
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ADDENDUM
Illinois Code §6-5-7(1)
Missouri Code §537.053(3)
Alabama Code §6-5-7(1)

ILLINOIS
LIQUOR CONTROL ACT
quor by a minor, there must be a showing
the defendant had immediate and exclusive
control of area where items were located.
Id.
Control, in prosecution charging possession of alcoholic liquor by a minor, may be
"exclusive'* even if possession is shown to
be joint. Id.

43 ^ 135
holic liquor, had possession of beer bottle
beyond a reasonable doubt, nor did it overcome testimony of occupants that defendant
at no time had possession of bottle. People
v
- Monroe, 1975, 31 Ill.App.3d i l l , 333
N.E.2d 239.

** Sentence and punishment
Where hearing in aggravation and mitiga4. Evidence
t j o n &„ p ^ 0 f guilty fully covered facts
Evidence, including testimony of police leading up to defendant's arrest, sentence of
officer that, upon stopping vehicle after ob- 30 days on each of 5 misdemeanor offenses,
serving a "wired on" license plate, he saw a including theft, accepting liquor as a minor,
partially full bottle of beer lying on floor reckless driving, transportation of an open
between right front door and front seat and liquor container, and fleeing or attempting
that defendant had been seated in front seat to elude a police officer, to be served conon right side, was insufficient to support a currently was not inappropriate. People v.
finding that defendant, charged with being a Richardson, 1969, 43 I11.2d 318, 253 N.E.2d
person under 19 years in possession of alco- 420.

135.

Actions for damages caused by intoxication—Lessor's liability—
Forfeiture of lease—Maximum recovery—Limitations—Jurisdiction—Service

§ 6-21. (a) Every person who is injured within this State, in person
or property, by any intoxicated person has a right ofertion in his or her
own name, severally or jointly, against any person, licensed under the
laws of this State or of any other state to sell alcoholic liquor, who, by
selling or giving alcoholic liquor, within or without the territorial limits
of this State, causes the intoxication of such person. Any person at least
21 years of age who pays for a hotel or motel room or facility knowing
that the room or facility is to be used by any person under 21 years of
age for the unlawful consumption of alcoholic liquors and such consumption causes the intoxication of the person under 21 years of age, shall be
liable to any person who is injured in person or property by the
intoxicated person under 21 years of age. Any person owning, renting,
leasing or permitting the occupation of any building or premises with
knowledge that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein, or who having
leased the same for oilier purposes, shall knowingly permit therein the
sale of any alcoholic liquors that have caused the intoxication of any
person, shall be liable, severally or jointly, with the person selling or
giving the liquors. However, if such building or premises belong to a
minor or other person under guardianship the guardian of such person
shall be held liable instead of the ward. A married woman has the same
right to bring the action and to control it and the amount recovered as an
unmarried woman. All damages recovered by a minor under this Act
shall be paid either to the minor, or to his or her parent, guardian or next
friend as the court shall direct. The unlawful sale or gift of alcoholic
liquor works a forfeiture of all rights of the lessee or tenant under any
121
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lease or contract of rent upon the premises where the unlawful sale or gift
takes place. All actions for damages under this Act may be by any
appropriate action in the circuit court. An action shall lie for injuries to
means of support caused by an intoxicated person or in consequence of
the intoxication of any person resulting as hereinabove set out. The
action, if the person from whom support was furnished is living, shall be
brought by any person injured in means of support in his or her name for
his or her benefit and the benefit of all other persons injured in means of
support. However, any person claiming to be injured in means of
support and not included in any action brought hereunder may join by
motion made within the times herein provided for bringing such action or
the personal representative of the deceased person from whom such
support was furnished may so join. In every such action the jury shall
determine the amount of damages to be recovered without regard to and
with no special instructions as to the dollar limits on recovery imposed
by this Section. The amount recovered in every such action is for the
exclusive benefit of the person injured in loss of support and shall be
distributed to such persons in the proportions determined by the verdict
rendered or judgment entered in the action. If the right of action is
settled by agreement with the personal representative of a deceased
person from whom support was furnished, the court having jurisdiction
of the estate of the deceased person shall distribute the amount of the
settlement to the person injured in loss of support in the proportion, as
determined by the court, that the percentage of dependency of each such
" person upon the deceased person bears to the sum of the percentages of
dependency of all such persons upon the deceased person. For all causes
of action involving persons injured, killed, or incurring property damage
before the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1985, in no event shall
the judgment or recovery under this Act for injury to the person or to the
property of any person as hereinabove set out exceed $15,000, and
recovery under this Act for loss of means of support resulting from the
death or injury of any person, as hereinabove set out, shall not exceed
$20,000. For all causes of action involving persons injured, killed, or
incurring property damage after the effective date of this amendatory Act
of 1985, in no event shall the judgment or recovery for injury to the
person or property of any person exceed $30,000 for each person
incurring damages, and recovery under this Act for loss of means of
support resulting from the death or injury of any person shall not exceed
$40,000. Nothing in this Section bars any person from making separate
claims which, in the aggregate, exceed any one limit where such person
incurs more than one type of compensable damage, including personal
injury, property damage, and loss to means of support. However, all
persons claiming loss to means of support shall be limited to an aggregate
122
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recovery not to exceed the single limitation set forth herein for the death
or injury of each person from whom support is claimed.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to confer a cause of action for
injuries to the person or property of the intoxicated person himself, nor
shall anything in this Act be construed to confer a cause of action for loss
of means of support on the intoxicated person himself or on any person
claiming to be supported by such intoxicated person. In conformance
with the rule of statutory construction enunciated in the general Illinois
saving provision in Section 4 of "AN ACT to revise the law in relation to
the construction of the statutes", approved March 5, 1874, as amended,1
no amendment of this Section purporting to abolish or having the effect
of abolishing a cause of action shall be applied to invalidate a cause of
action accruing before its effective date, irrespective of whether the
amendment was passed before or after the effective date of this Amendatory Act of 1986.
Each action hereunder shall be barred unless commenced within one
year next after the cause of action accrued.
However, a licensed distributor or brewer whose only connection with
the furnishing of alcoholic liquor which is alleged to have caused
intoxication was the furnishing or maintaining of any apparatus for the
dispensing or cooling of beer is not liable under this Section, and if such
licensee is named as a defendant, a proper motion to dismiss shall be
granted.
(b) Any person licensed under any state or local law to sell alcoholic
liquor, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or
through an agent causes the intoxication, by the sale or gift of alcoholic
liquor, of any person who, while intoxicated, causes injury to any person
or property in the State of Illinois thereby submits such licensed person,
and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State for a cause of action arising under subsection
(a) above.
Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this State^ as provided in this subsection, may be made by
personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as
provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, as now or hereafter amended,2
with the same force and effect as though summons had been personally
served within this State.
Only causes of action arising under subsection (a) above may be
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
or her is based upon this subsection.

123
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Nothing herein contained limits or affects the right to serve any
process in any other manner now or hereafter provided by law.
Laws 1933-34, 2nd Sp.Sess., p. 57, art. VI, § 14, eff. Jan. 31, 1934. Amended by
Laws 1949, p. 816, § 1, eff. Aug. 10, 1949; Laws 1955, p. 1961, § 1, eff. July 14,
1955; Laws 1959, p. 597, § 1, eff. July 8, 1959; Laws 1959, p. 1075, § 1, eff.
July 15, 1959; Laws 1963, p. 3324, § 1, eff. Aug. 23, 1963; Laws 1965, p. 2217,
§ 1, eff. Aug. 2, 1965; Laws 1967, p. 2701, § 1, eff. Aug. 7, 1967; P.A. 77-1186,
§ 1, eff. Aug. 19, 1971; P.A. 79-1360, § 35, eff. Oct. 1, 1976. Renumbered
§ 6-21 and amended by P.A. 82-783, Art. VI, § 2, eff. July 13, 1982. Amended
by P.A. 83-706, § 27, eff. Sept. 23, 1983; P.A. 84-271, § 1, eff. Sept. 12, 1985;
P.A. 84-634, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1986; P.A. 84-1308, Art. II, § 66, eff. Aug. 25,
1986; P.A. 84-1380, § 1, eff. Sept. 12, 1986; P.A. 84-1381, § 1, eff. Sept. 12,
1986.
1
2

Chapter 1, H 1103.
Chapter 110, H 1-101 et seq.
Historical Note

This paragraph is a substantial re-enactment of R.S. 1874, p. 438, § 9.
As originally enacted the paragraph read:
"Every husband, wife, child, parent,
guardian, employer or other person, who
shall be injured, in person or property, or
means of support, by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of the intoxication,
habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall
have a right of action in his or her own
name, severally or jointly, against any person or persons who shall, by selling or
giving alcoholic liquor, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of such
person; and any person owning, renting,
leasing or permitting the occupation of any
building or premises, and having knowledge
that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein,
or who having leased the same for other
purposes, shall knowingly permit therein
the sale of any alcoholic liquors that have
caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication
of any person, shall be liable, severally or
jointly, with the person or persons selling or
giving alcoholic liquors aforesaid, for all
damages sustained, and for exemplary damages; and a married woman shall have the
same right to bring suit and to control the
same and the amount recovered as a feme
sole; and all damages recovered by a minor
under this Act shall be paid either to such
minor, or to his or her parent, guardian or
next friend as the court shall direct; and
the unlawful sale, or giving away, of alcoholic liquor, shall work a forfeiture of all
rights of the lessee or tenant, under any
lease or contract of rent upon the premises
where such unlawful sale or giving away
shall take place; and all suits for damages

under this Act may be by any appropriate
action in any of the courts of this State
having competent jurisdiction."
The 1949 amendment substituted "as
hereinafter provided" for "for all damages
sustained, and for exemplary damages";
added the provisions relating to maximum
recovery allowed and a two year limitations
period.
The 1955 amendment rewrote the paragraph to read:
"Every person, who shall be injured, in
person or property by any intoxicated person, shall have a right of action in his or
her own name, severally or jointly, against
any person or persons who shall, by selling
or giving alcoholic liquor, have caused the
intoxication, in whole or in part, of such
person; and any person owning, renting,
leasing or permitting the occupation of any
building or premises, and having knowledge
that alcoholic liquors are to be sold therein,
or who having leased the same for other
purposes, shall knowingly permit therein
the sale of any alcoholic liquors that have
caused, in whole or in part, the intoxication
of any person, shall be liable, severally or
jointly, with the person or persons selling or
giving liquors aforesaid, as hereinafter provided; and a married woman shall have the
same right to bring suit and to control the
same and the amount recovered as a feme
sole; and all damages recovered by a minor
under this Act shall be paid either to such
minor, or to his or her parent, guardian or
next friend as the court shall direct; and
the unlawful sale, or giving away, of alcoholic liquor, shall work a forfeiture of all
rights of the lessee or tenant, under any
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involved in an accident, or in competitive sports,
or other emergency at the scene of an accident,
without first obtaining the consent of the parent
or guardian of the minor, and shall not be liable
for any civil damages other than damages occasioned by gross negligence or by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.
2. Any other person who has been trained to
provide first aid in a standard recognized training program may, without compensation, render
emergency care or assistance to the level for
which he or she has been trained, at the scene of
an emergency or accident, and shall not be liable for civil damages for acts or omissions other
than damages occasioned by gross negligence or
by willful or wanton acts or omissions by such
person in rendering such emergency care.

5394

vidual, shall be liable for the payment for that
judgment up to an amount not to exceed two
thousand dollars, provided that the parent or
guardian has been joined as a party defendant
in the original action. The judgment provided
herein to be paid shall be paid to the person injured, but such payment shall not be a bar to
any criminal action or any proceeding against
the unemancipated minor for such damage for
the balance of the judgment not paid by the
parent or guardian.
3. Upon rendering a judgment in any proceeding under this section, the judge may order
the parent or guardian, or the minor who damaged the property or caused the personal injury,
to work for the owner of the property damaged
or the person injured in lieu of payment, if the
parent, minor and the owner of the property
damaged or the person injured are agreeable.

(L. 1979 H.B. 445 § 1, A.L. 1983 1st Ex. Scss. H.B. 8, A.L.
1986 H.B. 860)
(L. 1965 p. 661 | 1, A.L. 1979 H.B. 207)

537.040. Married woman alone liable for her
torts.—For all civil injuries committed by a
married woman, damages may be recovered
against her alone, and her husband shall not be
responsible therefor, except in cases where,
under the law, he would be jointly responsible
with her, if the marriage did not exist.
(RSMo 1939 § 3680)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3290; 1919 § 4241
(1986) The court abolished the doctrine of interspousai immunity as a bar to claims for intentional torts. Townsend v.
Townsend (Mo. banc), 708 S.W.2d 646.
(1986) The doctrine of spousal immunity is no longer available as a bar to negligence actions. S.A.V. v. K.G.V. (Mo.
t>ane), 708 S.W.2d 651.

537.045. Parent or guardian liable for damages by minor—when—limitation—work accepted in lieu of payment—I. The parent or
guardian, excluding foster parents, of any unemancipated minor, under eighteen years of
age, in their care and custody, against whom
judgment has been rendered for purposely
marking upon, defacing or in any way damaging any property, shall be liable for the payment
of that judgment up to an amount not to exceed
two thousand dollars, provided that the parent
or guardian has been joined as a party defendant in the original action. The judgment provided herein to be paid shall be paid to the
owner of the property damaged, but such payment shall not be a bar to any criminal action
or any proceeding against the unemancipated
minor for such damage for the balance of the
judgment not paid by the parent or guardian.
2. The parent or guardian, excluding foster
parents, of any unemancipated minor, under
eighteen years of age, in their care and custody,
against whom judgment has been rendered for
purposely causing personal injury to any indi-

537.050. Civil action not merged in criminal
prosecution.—In no case shall the right of action of any party injured by the commission of
any felony or misdemeanor be deemed or adjudged to be merged in such felony or misdemeanor; but he may recover the amount of
damages sustained thereby in an action to be
brought before any court or tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
(RSMo 1939 § 3679)
Prior revisions: 1929 § 3289; 1919 § 4240; 1909 § 5447

537.053. Sale of alcoholic beverage not
proximate cause of personal injuries or death—
exceptions—requirements—(dram shop law).—
1. Since the repeal of the Missouri Dram Shop
Act in 1934 (Laws of 1933-34, extra session,
page 77), it has been and continues to be the
policy of this state to follow the common law of
England, as declared in section 1.010, RSMo, to
prohibit dram shop liability and to follow the
common law rule that furnishing alcoholic beverages is not the proximate cause of injuries inflicted by intoxicated persons.
2. The legislature hereby declares that this
section shall be interpreted so that the holdings
in cases such as Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d
570 (Mo.App.1983); Sampson v. W.F. Enterprises, Inc. 611 S.W. 2d 333 (Mo.App.1980);
and Ncsbitt v. Westport Square, Ltd., 624
S.W.2d 519 (Mo.App.1981) be abrogated in
favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the
consumption ot alcoholic beverages, rather than
the furnishing of alcoholic beverages, to be the
proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
3. Notwithstanding subsections 1 and 2 of
this section, a cause of action may be brought
by or on behalf of any person who has suffered

5395
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personal injury or death against any person licensed to sell intoxicating liquor by the drink
for consumption on the premises who, pursuant
to section 311.310, RSMo, has been convicted,
or has received a suspended imposition of the
sentence arising from the conviction, of the sale
of intoxicating liquor to a person under the age
of twenty-one years or an obviously intoxicated
person if the sale of such intoxicating liquor is
the proximate cause of the personal injury or
death sustained by such person.
(L. 1985 S.B. 345 f 1)
(1985) There is no common-law "dramshop" liability on the
part of a social host who serves alcohol in his home to an
intoxicated guest who later injures a third party. Harnman v.
Smith (A.), 697 S.W.2d 219.

537.060. Contribution between tort-feasors
—release of one or more, effect.—Defendants in
a judgment founded on an action for the redress
of a private wrong shall be subject to contribution, and all other consequences of such judgment, in the same manner and to the same extent as defendants in a judgment in an action
founded on contract. When an agreement by release, covenant not to sue or not to enforce a
judgment is given in good faith to one of two or
more persons liable in tort for the same injury
or wrongful death, such agreement shall not discharge any of the other tort-feasors for the
damage unless the terms of the agreement so
provide; however such agreement shall reduce
the claim by the stipulated amount of the agreement, or in the amount of consideration paid,
whichever is greater. The agreement shall discharge the tort-feasor to whom it is given from
all liability Yor contribution or noncontractual
indemnity to any other tort-feasor. The term
"noncontractual indemnity" as used in this section refers to indemnity between joint tortfeasors culpably negligent, having no legal relationship to each other and does not include indemnity which comes about by reason of contract, or by reason of vicarious liability.
(RSMo 1939 § 3658, A.L. 1983 H.B. 135 & 194)
Prior revisions: 1929 | 3268; 1919 § 4223; 1909 § 5431
(1974) When joint tort-feasors are each chargeable with active or affirmative negligence, neither is entitled to indemnity
from the other; however, one may be entitled to contribution
from the other. Lewis v. Amchem Products, Inc. (A.), 510
S.W.2d 46.

537.065. Claimant and tort-feasor may contract to limit recovery to specified assets or insurance contract—effect.—Any person having
an unliquidated claim for damages against a
tort-feasor, on account of bodily injuries or
death, may enter into a contract with such tortfeasor! or any insurer in his behalf or both,
whereby, in consideration of the payment of a
specified amount, the person asserting the claim
agrees that in the event of a judgment against
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the tort-feasor, neither he nor any person, firm
or corporation claiming by or through him will
levy execution, by garnishment or as otherwise
provided by law, except against the specific assets listed in the contract and except against
any insurer which insures the legal liability of
the tort-feasor for such damage and which insurer is not excepted from execution, garnishment or other legal procedure by such contract.
Execution or garnishment proceedings in aid
thereof shall lie only as to assets of the tort-feasor specifically mentioned in the contract or the
insurer or insurers not excluded in such contract. Such contract, when properly acknowledged by the parties thereto, may be recorded in
the office of the recorder of deeds in any county
where a judgment may be rendered, or in the
county of the residence of the tort-feasor, or in
both such counties, and if the same is so recorded then such tort-feasor's property, except
as to the assets specifically listed in the contract,
shall not be subject to any judgment lien as the
result of any judgment rendered against the
tort-feasor, arising out of the transaction for
which the contract is entered into.
(L. 1959 S.B. 259 § 1)
(1974) This section does not deprive insuror of right to be
heard on question of coverage or collusion and does not discriminate against insurors. Butters v. City of Independence
(Mo.), 513 S.W.2d 418.
(1975) Guardian ad litem who sat silent during alleged improper argument and who made an admission of liability held
not to have violated his duty to ward and to have owed no
duty to insuror after having proceeded under this section.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of
Am. (Mo.), 522 S.W.2d 809.

537.080. Action for wrongful death—who
may sue—limitation.—Whenever the death of a
person results from any act, conduct, occurrence, transaction, or circumstance which, if
death had not ensued, would have entitled such
person to recover damages in respect thereof,
the person or party who, or the corporation
which, would have been liable if death had not
ensued shall be liable in an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured,
which damages may be sued for
(1) By the spouse or children, natural or
adopted, legitimate or illegitimate, or by the father or mother of the deceased, natural or adoptive;
(2) If there be no persons in class (1) entitled
to bring the action, then by the brother or sister
of the deceased, or their descendants, who can
establish his or her right to those damages set
out in section 537.090 because of the death;
(3) If there be no persons in class (1) or (2)
entitled to bring the action, then by a plaintiff
ad litem. Such plaintiff ad litem shall be appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the
action for damages provided in this section upon
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Where a restraint upon trade or
monopolization
is
result
of
valid
governmental action, as opposed to private
action, no violation of this section can be made
out. Twine v Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 294 Ala.
43, 311 So. 2d 299 (1975).
Collateral references. — 58 C.J.S.,
Monopolies, §§ 95-104.
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54 Am. Jur. 2d, Monopolies, Restraints of
Trade & Unfair Trade Practices, §§ 623-640.
VI?MTTIT
*"• V E N U E .
Collateral references. •— 54 Am. Jur. 2d,
Monopolies, Restraints of Trade & Unfair Trade
Practices, § 634.

ARTICLE 6.
ILLEGAL LIQUOR SALES.

§ 6-5-70. Furnishing liquor to minors.
Either parent of a minor, guardian or a person standing in loco parentis to
the minor having neither father nor mother shall have a right of action against
any person who unlawfully sells or furnishes spirituous liquors to such minor
and may recover such damages as the jury may assess, provided the person
selling or furnishing liquor to the minor had knowledge of or was chargeable
with notice or knowledge of such minority. Only one action may be commenced
for each offense under this section. (Code 1907, § 2467; Code 1923, § 5673; Code
1940, T. 7, § 120.)
Cross reference. — As to prohibition against
selling, giving, etc., alcoholic beverages to
minors, see § 28-3-260.
Collateral references. — 48 C.J.S.,
Intoxicating Liquors, § 290.

45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§
553-556, 561-614.

§ 6-5-71. Right of action of wife, child, parent or other person for injury in
consequence of illegal sale or disposition of liquor or beverages.
(a) Every wife, child, parent or other person who shall be injured in person,
property or means of support by any intoxicated person or in consequence of
the intoxication of any person shall have a right of action against any person
who shall, by selling, giving or otherwise disposing of to another, contrary to
the provisions of law, any liquors or beverages; cause the intoxication of such
person for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary damages.
(b) Upon the death of any party, the action or right of action will survive to
or against his executor or administrator,
(c) The party injured, or his legal representative, may commence a joint or
separate action against the person intoxicated or the person who furnished the
liquor, and all such claims shall be by civil action in any court having jurisdiction
thereof. (Acts 1909, No. 191, p. 63; Code 1923, §§ 5674, 5675; Code 1940, T. 7,
§§ 121, 122.)
I. General Consideration.
II. Right of Action.
III. Survival of Action.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
Cited in Draughon's Bus. College v. Battles,
37 Ala. App. 24, 68 So. 2d 58 (1952); Shirley v.

Shirley, 261 Ala. 100, 73 So. 2d 77 (1954);
Campbell v. Davis, 274 Ala. 555, 150 So. 2d 187
(1962).
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II. RIGHT OF ACTION.
Section evidences policy to discourage
illegal sale of alcoholic beverages. Phillips v.
Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951).
Section does not give cause of action for
wrongful death. — Damages recoverable are
expressly declared to be those actually sustained
by injury to person or property. Thus where
plaintiffs decedent was killed in automobile
collision with defendant's decedent, who was
allegedly intoxicated, the plaintiff had no cause
of action under this section. Webb v. French, 228
Ala. 43, 152 So. 215 (1934).
Complaint in action for sale to minor. — In
an action under this section it was not necessary
for the plaintiff to aver that the defendants were
licensees where the complaint showed that the
person to whom the beverage was sold was a
minor, for such a sale is in contravention of law
by whomsoever made. Phillips v. Derrick, 36 Ala.
App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951).
Proof of causal connection between sale and
injury not required. — By the terms of this
section the person injured by the illegal sale of
alcoholic beverages is not held to the usual
standards of proof of causal connection between
the illegal sale of the beverages and the injury.
Phillips v. Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d
320 (1951).
- Evidence making out prima facie case. —
Under this section a plaintiff made out a prima
facie case when he introduced evidence tending
to show injury to property by intoxicated person
who has been furnished alcoholic beverages by
the defendant in violation of law. Phillips v.
Derrick, 36 Ala. App. 244, 54 So. 2d 320 (1951).
Collateral references. — 48 CJ.S.,
Intoxicating Liquors, §§ 430-485.
45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors, §§
553-556, 561-614.
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Federal constitutional and legislative
provisions as to intoxicating liquors as affecting
state statutes imposing liability for damages on
seller. 70 ALR 140.
Liability of saloon keeper for injury to patron
by other persons. 106 ALR 1003.
Common-law right of action for personal
injury or death of third person resulting from act
of intoxicated consumer of liquor. 130 ALR 366.
Liability of lessor or his property for damages
resulting from lessee's sale of intoxicating
liquor. 169 ALR 1203.
What constitutes "injury in person or
property" within civil damage or dramshop act
6 ALR2d 798.
Civil liability for suicide resulting from use of
intoxicating liquor. 23 ALR 1276,11 ALR2d 765.
Extraterritorial effect of civil damage or
dramshop act. 22 ALR2d 1128.
What constitutes "intoxicating liquor" within
civil damage act. 52 ALR2d 890.
Wife's right of action at common law for loss
of consortion as result of furnishing drugs or
liquor to husband. 73 ALR2d 1384.
Husband's right of action at common law for
loss of wife's services sustained by husband in
consequence of sale or gift of intoxicating liquor
to wife. 75 ALR2d 834, 838.
III. SURVIVAL OF ACTION.
Section confined to personal injury not
causing death. — This section may be given full
effect by confining it to causes of action
accruing for personal injury not causing death,
wherein the living has a just demand against the
living for actual damages sustained by tortious
act In such case this section seems to keep alive
such demand in favor of the estate of the one
against the estate of the other. Webb v. French,
228 Ala. 43, 152 So. 215 (1934).
Collateral references. — 25A CJ.S., Death,
§§ 39-42.

ARTICLE 7.
ACTIONS AGAINST ESTATE FOR
TRESPASS, WASTE, ETC.

§ 6-5-90. Right of action against executor or administrator.
Any person or his personal representatives may commence an action against
the executor or administrator of any testator or intestate who in his lifetime has
wasted, destroyed, taken, carried away or converted to his own use the goods
or chattels of any such person or committed any trespass on the real estate of
such person. (Code 1923, § 5710; Code 1940, T. 7, § 137.)
Cross reference. — As to criminal trespass,
see § 13-2-100 et seq.

There is distinction between "actions" and
"causes of action." An "action" is a proceeding
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ARTICLE 6.
ILLEGAL LIQUOR SALES.

6-5-70. Furnishing liquor to minors.
Legislative intent. — Considering the tone
f the times in which this section was enacted,
nd considering this section on its face, this
action is a temperance or prohibition proviion, intended to deter the sale of "spirituous
iquors" to minors, to deter the intoxication of
he minor that would result from such a sale,
nd to provide a remedy for the aggrieved
arties that this section describes. Espey v.
lonvenience Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221
(Via. 1991).
The words "furnishes" and "furnishing"
xtend liability under this section to a seller or
irnisher of spirituous liquors, who, from the
Dtality of the circumstances, must reasonably
lfer that the person to whom the spirituous
quor is sold or furnished will permit a minor
) consume some of the spirituous liquor,
aymon v. Braddock, 544 So. 2d 900 (Ala.
989).
"Layman's" totality of the circumstances
ast is specifically related to the terms "furishes" and "furnishing" in § 6-5-70; this test
as yet to be applied to Dram Shop actions
nder § 6-5-71. Espey v. Convenience Mareters, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991).
Section 28-3-l(15),s definition of "liquor"
i not determinative of the definition of the
arm "spirituous liquors" in this section. Espey
. Convenience Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d
221 (Ala. 1991).
For the purposes of this section the term

"spirituous liquors" includes beer; thus,
father's claim under this section against store
which sold beer to his son who was subsequently killed in alcohol-related crash could
proceed. Espey v. Convenience Marketers, Inc.,
578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991).
Right of action created in minor's pare n t — This section creates a right of action in
a parent of a minor against any person who
unlawfully sells or furnishes spirituous liquors
to such minor, not to the parent of another
minor. Parker v. Miller Brewing Co., 560 So.
2d 1030 (Ala. 1990).
Minor has no right of action under this
section. Maples v. Chinese Palace, Inc., 389
So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1980).
The trial court did not err in directing
the verdict for seller of alcoholic beverages since there was no evidence, or reasonable inference that could have been drawn
from the evidence, to indicate that minor
consumed any of the wine coolers purchased
during the visit to the store. Laymon v.
Braddock, 544 So. 2d 900 (Ala. 1989).
Collateral references.
What constitutes violation of an act prohibiting sale of intoxicating liquor to a minor. 89
ALR3d 1256.
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's
negligence. 62 ALR4th 16.

6-5-71. Right of action of wife, child, parent or other person for
injury in consequence of illegal sale or disposition of
liquor or beverages.
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATION.
"Other person." — The classof potential
laintiifs designated as "other person" includes
nyone who is proximately injured in person,
roperty or means of support by any intoxiited person or in consequence of the intoxicaon of any person. This category of plaintiffs is
s broad as proof of proximate cause will
ermit. Ward v. Rhodes, Hammonds & Beck,
ic, 511 So. 2d 159 (Ala. 1987).
i*Contrary to the provisions of law" contrued. — Store's selling of beer to one party,
ho then gave it to a third party, was not a
isposition of the beer to the third party by the
.ore that was "contrary to the provisions of

law" in claim based on third party's intoxication under this section. Espey v. Convenience
Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991).
"Layman's" totality of the circumstances
test is specifically related to the terms "furnishes" and "furnishing" in § 6-5-70; this test
has yet to be applied to Dram Shop actions
under this section. Espey v. Convenience Marketers, Inc., 578 So. 2d 1221 (Ala. 1991).
No direct common law action. — Lounge
patron who was injured by another, intoxicated
lounge patron did not have a direct common
law cause of action against the lounge. Ward v.
Rhodes, Hammonds & Beck, Inc., 511 So. 2d
159 (Ala. 1987).
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— Act is not limited to involuntary intoxiNation. — T n e Alabama Dram Shop Act is
•clear and it makes no distinction between
Voluntary and involuntary consumption of al£ohol; if the act were limited to involuntary
•intoxication, then the act would have virtually
n 0 application; if the legislature had intended
for the act to apply only in cases of involuntary
intoxication, it could have so stated. Jaitfes v.
3rewton Motel Mgt, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala.
1990).
•Voluntary intoxication of deceased was
not a defense to an action brought by the
deceased's minor children under the Pram
Shop Act. James v. Brewton Motel Mgt, Inc.,
570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 1990); James v. Najor,
575 So. 2d 1105 (Ala. 1991).
Absence of visible intoxication of car
driver and passenger while in defendant's bar
was ground for summary judgment ii* bar
daughter severely injured in automobile accident with the two bar patrons. Liao v. Harry's
Bar, 574 So. 2d 775 (Ala. 1990).
Award of actual damages not required.
— In a dram shop action, when there is
sufficient evidence of actual damage or injury
to support an award of compensatory daniages,
the law does not require a specific aw^rd of
actual damages in order to support an award of
punitive damages. Booth, Inc. v. Miles, 567 So.
2d 1206 (Ala. 1990).
Cited in Gregory v. Western World InB. Co.,
481 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1985); Messick v. Moring,
514 So. 2d 892 (Ala. 1987); Odom ex rel. Odom
v. Blackburn, 559 So. 2d 1080 (Ala. 1990).
Collateral references.
Validity, construction, and effect of statute
limiting amount recoverable in dram shop
action. 78 ALR4th 542.
II. RIGHT OF ACTION.
This section creates a civil reniedy
against persons who, contrary to law, cause the
intoxication of another by providing the other
person with alcoholic beverages, when the
plaintiff is injured because of the intoxication.
Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958 (Ala. 1987).
Persons injured by intoxicated minors who
were supplied with alcoholic beverages by a
noncommercial supplier have a right of action
Vagainst such supplier. Martin v. Watts, 513 So.
2d 958 (Ala. 1987).
Term which most narrowly limits cause
of action is requirement that providing of
alcoholic beverages be contrary to law.
Smoyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce, 517 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1987).
Alabama's dram shop statute creates a
civil action against a purveyor of alcoholic
beverages in favor of any person, or the
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personal representative of any person, injured
or killed by an intoxicated person when the
beverages causing the intoxication were dispensed contrary to the provisions of law. Buchanan v. Merger Enters., Inc., 463 So. 2d 121
(Ala. 1984).
Legislatively created principles of dram shop
liability, not fully implemented by the, acts
themselves, can be effectuated by a common
law negligence action. Under the common law
doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal is
liable for the negligence of his agents committed within the scope of their employment.
Thus, the summary judgment granted by the
trial court in favor of a licensee, on grounds
that the alcoholic beverages were sold by his
employee rather than the licensee himself, was
reversed. Putman v. Cromwell, 475 So. 2d 524
(Ala. 1985).
The words, "every wife, child, parent"
denote Te\a1aonsnip Yo peTson \o wnom
intoxicating liquors were sold. Maples v.
Chinese Palace, Inc., 389 So. 2d 120 (Ala.
1980).
No liability for selling to minor who then
gives to second minor. — Selling alcohol to
one minor, who then gives part of the alcohol to
a second minor, is not furnishing alcohol to the
second minor creating liability under this
section. Parker v. Miller Brewing Co., 560 So.
2d 1030 (Ala. 1990).
Actions brought by minor children. —
Minor children of one who is killed because of
his own intoxication are protected parties, and
thus, have a cause of action against the seller
of the intoxicating beverage under the Alabama Dram Shop Act. James v. Brewton Motel
Mgt., Inc., 570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. 1990).
Minors, who appealed through their grandmother and mother respectively, for damages
for the death of their father, were parties
protected by this section, and therefore, were
entitled to sue under the statute. James v.
Najor, 575 So. 2d 1105 (Ala. 1991).
Where father was killed because of his own
intoxication and where father's minor children
Drought an action under this section, minor
children were not attempting to bring a wrongful death action in the guise of an action under
this section; they clearly alleged damages for
loss of support allowed by the act. James v.
Brewton Motel Mgt., Inc., 570 So. 2d 1225 (Ala.
1990).
Intoxicated person's wife was a protected party under the act and was entitled to
bring an action against liquor supplier. Weeks
v. Princeton's, 570 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. 1990).
The intoxicated person is not a protected
party under the act Weeks v. Princeton's,
570 So. 2d 1232 (Ala. 1990).
No
violation
of
law
if
social
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host/nonlicensee serves 19-year-old. —
There is not any constitutional provision or
any statute that makes it a criminal offense for
a nonlicensee/social host to furnish alcoholic
beverages to a person 19 years of age; thus,
even if reception hosts had provided champagne to 19-year-old owner of car that injured
plaintiffs daughter, summary judgment in
their favor would still have been proper because there would have been no violation of
law. Furthermore, since furnishing alcohol to
19-year-old is not illegal, summary judgment
was proper for the actual champagne supplier,
the groom. Liao v. Harry's Bar, 574 So. 2d 775
(Ala. 1990).
Wedding reception hosts not liable for
injuries where guest of honor provided
alcohol. — One of the essential elements of a
cause of action under this section is that the
defendant provided alcoholic beverages to the
intoxicated person who caused the injury; thus,
where undisputed evidence showed that the
groom, not the hosts, provided the champagne
for the reception, summary judgment in host's
favor was proper. Liao v. Harry's Bar, 574 So.
2d 775 (Ala. 1990).
Host not liable for injuries where guests
not charged to attend or for drinks. —
Where defendant was host of a party where
none of the guests was charged to attend or to
drink the alcoholic beverages provided, an
action for common-law negligence would not
lie against defendant where automobile accident, in which the intoxicated guest was involved, ensued. Beeson v. Scoles Cadillac
Corp., 506 So. 2d 999 (Ala. 1987).
As to a right of action, the party intoxicated is excluded. — The persons enumerated are persons who stand to him in special
relations, and it is therefore to be assumed that
'any other person" who may sue must also
stand to him in some special relation so as to
)e injured by his intoxication or by the sale,
jtc., to him. Maples v. Chinese Palace, Inc.,
{89 So. 2d 120 (Ala. 1980).
Summary judgment proper for defenlant where plaintiff injured by negligent
Iriving of volunteer waiter who was served
ree drinks at a chamber of commerce function.
mover v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Comlerce, 517 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1987).
Where defendant's only connection to the
tiamber of commerce function where liquor
as served was that he rented a reception
>om to the chamber of commerce, summary
idgment was properly granted since in order
r the Dram Shop Act to apply, a person must
ave provided alcoholic beverages to another.
Tioyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Comerce, 517 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1987).
Qwner of cabin where minors became
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intoxicated held not subject to suit —
Where minors became intoxicated at a cabin
party hosted by a service club and an individual sponsor, an action under this section would
lie against the club and the sponsor but not
against the cabin owner, whose only connection to the party was his ownership interest in
the cabin and his presence during the party.
Martin v. Watts, 513 So. 2d 958 (Ala. 1987).
A limited partnership which hosted a party
given at a country club where country club
employees allegedly continued serving alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated guest
whose intoxication allegedly caused an automobile accident in which plaintiffs decedent
was killed, could not be held liable as the
alcoholic beverage control board's regulation
applies only to licensees and the partnership
was not a licensee, and there was nothing else
tending to show that the partnership dispensed
alcoholic beverages. Lackey v. HealthAmerica
Ala., 514 So. 2d 883 (Ala. 1987).
Where the record revealed no evidence
that defendant lounge provided driver involved in automobile accident with any
alcoholic beverages on the day in question,
the trial court was correct in granting defendant lounge's motion for a directed verdict,
since one of the elements of a cause of action
under the Dram Shop Act is that the defendant
provide alcoholic beverages to the intoxicated
person who caused the accident. Nelson v.
Dunaway, 536 So. 2d 955 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
Cited in DeLoach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co.,
378 So. 2d 733 (Ala. 1979).
Collateral references.
Recovery under Civil Damage (Dram Shop)
Act for intangibles such as mental anguish,
embarrassment, loss of affection or companionship, or the like. 78 ALR3d 1199.
Liability of persons furnishing intoxicating
liquor for injury to or death of consumer,
outside coverage of civil damage acts. 98
ALR3d 1230.
Choice of law as to liability of liquor seller
for injuries caused by intoxicated person. 2
ALR4th 952.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground
for liability of state or local government unit or
officer. 48 ALR4th 320.
Social host's liability for injuries incurred by
third parties as a result of intoxicated guest's
negligence. 62 ALR4th 16.
Alcohol-related vehicular homicide: Nature
and elements of offense. 64 ALR4th 166.
Passenger's liability to vehicular accident
victim for harm caused by intoxicated motoi
vehicle driver. 64 ALR4th 272.
Driving while intoxicated: "choice of evils'
defense that driving was necessary to protect
life or property. 64 ALR4th 298.
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ARTICLE 8.
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION AND DECEIT.
The elements of the tort of bad faith may
be proved, as with other intentional torts, by
circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Recoverable damages may include mental distress and economic loss. Chavers v. National
Security Fire & Cas. Co, 405 So. 2d 1 (Ala.
1981).
Tort of outrage. — The law to be applied in
a case involving the tort of outrage has been
clearly stated: the behavior of a defendant

must be so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community. Barrett v. Farmers & Merchants
Bank, 451 So. 2d 257 (Ala. 1984).
Cited in Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Lewis, 416
So. 2d 410 (Ala. 1982); Army Aviation Center
Fed. Credit Union v. Poston, 460 So. 2d 139
(Ala. 1984).

§ 6-5-100. Fraud — Right of action generally.
The critical elements of an action for
fraud are: (a) A false representation usually
concerning an existing material fact; (b) representation which (1) the defendant knew was
false when made, or (2) was made recklessly
and without regard to its truth or falsity, or (3)
was made by telling plaintiff that defendant
had knowledge that the representation was
true while not having such knowledge; (c)
reliance by the plaintiff on the representation
and that he was deceived by it; (d) reliance
which was justified under the circumstances;
and (e) damage to the plaintiff proximately
resulting from his reliance. Army Aviation
Center Fed. Credit Union v. Poston, 460 So. 2d
139 (Ala. 1984); Patel v. Hanna, 525 So. 2d
1359 (Ala. 1988).
Reliance and damages are elements of
fraud action. — Plaintiff complaint that alleged bank official and her former husband
misrepresented that her note was secured by
her car and that bank could repossess car for
failure to make payments would not allow her
to recover since she was obligated to make
payments pursuant to her divorce decree and
she quit making payments. Reliance and damages are elements of a fraud action and were
not present under these facts. Timmons v.
Central Bank, 528 So. 2d 845 (Ala. 1988).
Essential to a claim of fraud under Alabama law is a material misrepresentation
of fact which has led another to act to his
detnment. United States v. Burgreen, 591 F.2d
291 (5th Cir. 1979).
1
To constitute fraud, there must be some
misrepresentation of material fact to a party
who relies upon such misrepresentation to his
detnment. Parker v. Thyssen Mining Constr.,
Inc., 428 So. 2d 615 (Ala. 1983).
To be actionable fraud, a statement must
misrepresent a material fact and the defrauded
party must act upon it to his damage. Ameri-

can Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v Sherrard, 477 So.
2d 287 (Ala. 1985).
Intent to defraud not essential under
section.
In accord with first paragraph in the bound
volume. See Burlington N R.R. v. Warren, 574
So. 2d 758 (Ala. 1990).
Contract actions alleging misrepresentation ordinarily sound in tort. — Ordinarily, actions to rescind a contract, alleging
misrepresentation of matenal facts relied upon
to the plaintiff 's detnment, are statutorily
grounded actions in tort. Spanish Fort Mobile
Homes, Inc. v. Sebnte Corp., 369 So. 2d 777
(Ala. 1979).
Reliance must be reasonable. — In order
to recover for fraud, a plaintiffs reliance on
false statements must be reasonable. Newman
v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 So. 2d 106 (Ala. 1986).
Mere puffery will not support a claim of
fraud. American Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v.
Sherrard, 477 So. 2d 287 (Ala. 1985).
Overt act by conspirator in furtherance
of the conspiracy is not essential element
of fraud. — That a particular conspirator
commit an overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy is not an essential element of the
fraud claim. Huckleberry v. M.C. Dixon Lumber Co., 503 So. 2d 1209 (Ala. 1987).
A representation regarding acts or
events to take place in the future constitutes fraud only if, at the time of making the
statement, the party intends to deceive and not
to perform the acts promised. Amencan Pioneer Life Ins. Co. v. Sherrard, 477 So. 2d 287
(Ala. 1985).
Sufficiency of complaint
Where the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that
the defendants knowingly made exaggerated
projections of the earning capacity of a pizza
franchise upon which the plaintiffs relied in
purchasing the franchise, the complaint stated

61

